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eral recent decisions affecting New York practice. In Assael v. Assael, the Appellate Division, First Department, determined that a
plaintiff did not waive the right to compel arbitration of a corporation's dissolution by seeking a preliminary injunction when the
contract that provided for the arbitration also specifically allowed
each party to seek injunctive relief without waiving other remedies.
In Baker v. Board of Education, a unanimous Court of Appeals held the applicable statute of limitations for a cause of action
for breach of the duty of fair representation against a public union
was six years. In applying the six-year catch-all provision of CPLR
213(1), the Court of Appeals rejected the lower court's determination that the action was governed by the six-month federal statute
of limitations period that had previously been applied in similar
actions against private unions.
Finally, in In re Stein, the Appellate Division, Second Department, delineated the circumstances in which the proceeds of an
insurance policy may properly be received by a trustee-beneficiary.
Payment is proper, held the court, only if the trust agreement predated the designation of the beneficiary under the insurance policy
and that trust agreement was identified in the beneficiary
designation.
The members of Volume 62 hope that the New York bench
and bar find the cases analyzed in The Survey to be of interest and
value.
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Under a contract containinga broad arbitrationclause and a provision specifically authorizing either party to seek injunctive relief without waiving other remedies, the procurement of a court
ordered preliminary injunction does not waive the right to arbitrate issues on which the injunctive relief is based
Arbitration is a system for the resolution of contractual disputes in which the parties create the forum and appoint impartial
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monitors.1 The right to seek arbitration of a dispute may be expressly or impliedly waived by either party to the agreement.2
I See M. DOMKm, DOMKE ON CoMM RciAL ARBrrRATION § 1.01, at 1 (rev. ed. 1984). Arbitration is defined as:
[A] contractual proceeding, whereby the parties to any controversy or dispute, in
order to obtain an inexpensive and speedy final disposition of the matter involved,
select judges of their own choice and by consent submit their controversy to such
judges for determination, in the place of the tribunals provided by the ordinary
processes of law.
Id. (citing Gates v. Arizona Brewing Co., 54 Ariz. 266, 269, 95 P.2d 49, 50 (1939)).
Arbitration is an efficient alternative to the judicial process but does not completely
preempt the area. Id. § 1.01, at 2. Instead, arbitration coexists with the courts as a viable
alternative forum in which to resolve disputes. Id. Unlike judges, arbitrators need not accompany their decisions with written opinions and their decisions generally are not subject
to appeal. Id.
Prior to 1920, an agreement to arbitrate was held void as against public policy because
it was deemed an attempt to oust the courts of their juristiction. See Meacham v. Jamestown, F. & C. R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 351-52, 105 N.E. 653, 655 (1914). However, in 1920, New
York law was amended to recognize and enforce agreements to arbitrate disputes, present or
future. See Arbitration Law, ch. 275, § 2, [1920] N.Y. Laws 803, 804. The Arbitration Law
was then upheld by the Court of Appeals in Berkovitz v. Arbib & Houlberg, Inc., 230 N.Y.
261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921). Today, courts rarely interfere with an agreement to arbitrate. In
fact, they often stay their own proceedings if initiated in violation of the agreement and
thereby "compel" arbitration. See SEEGFL § 586, at 827 (1978). But see Maye v. Bluestein, 40
N.Y.2d 113, 118, 351 N.E.2d 717, 720, 386 N.Y.S.2d 69, 72 (1976) (arbitration should be
used sparingly if potential conflict exists between arbitration and existing litigation).
The right to freely enter into arbitration agreements without state interference is based
upon the United States Constitution, which provides that "[n]o state shall ...pass any...
[lI]aw impairing the [o]bligation of [c]ontracts." See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1. Chief
Judge Cardozo succinctly noted that "[p]arties to a contract may agree ....that any and all
controversies growing out of it in any way shall be submitted to arbitration. If they do, the
courts of New York will give effect to their intention." Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg.
Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 298, 169 N.E. 386, 391 (1929), appeal dismissed, 282 U.S. 808 (1930); see
also Walter A. Stanley & Sons, Inc. v. Trustees of Hackley School, 42 N.Y.2d 436, 439, 366
N.E.2d 1339, 1341, 397 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986 (1977) (parties' intention to arbitrate should be
judically respected).
The right to compel arbitration is purely contractual. See Acting Superintendent of
Schools v. United Liverpool Faculty Ass'n, 42 N.Y.2d 509, 512, 369 N.E.2d 746, 748, 399
N.Y.S.2d 189, 191 (1977). Parties to a commercial contract "will not be held to have chosen
arbitration as the forum for the resolution of their disputes in the absence of an express,
unequivocal agreement to that effect." Id.; see also Calvin Klein Co. v. Minnetonka, Inc., 88
App. Div. 2d 503, 504, 449 N.Y.S.2d 729, 731 (1st Dep't 1982) (petitioners could not compel
arbitration as they were not signatories to agreement containing arbitration clause).
2 See Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N.Y. 15, 19, 139 N.E. 764, 765 (1923); see also Sherrill
v. Grayco Builders, Inc., 64 N.Y.2d 261, 272, 475 N.E.2d 772, 775, 486 N.Y.S.2d 159, 162
(1985) (right to arbitrate may be modified, waived, or abandoned); Nagy v. Arcas Brass &
Iron Co., 242 N.Y. 97, 98, 150 N.E. 614, 614 (1926) (party to arbitration agreement can
waive rights thereunder).
"There is no set rule as to what constitutes a waiver or abandonment of the right to
arbitrate." In re American News Co., 130 N.Y.S.2d 554, 557 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1954).
Rather, the court must determine on a case-by-case basis whether the parties actually in-
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Generally, the right to compel arbitration is waived by a party's
failure to proceed for an unreasonable period of time after an order
directing arbitration has been made,3 or by a party's refusal to submit to arbitration proceedings. 4 Similarly, litigation of a disputed
claim relinquishes the plaintiff's right to compel arbitration, 5 extended to relinquish a known right. See id. at 557-58. Waiver is defined as "an intentional
abandonment or relinquishment of a known right." Id. at 558 (quoting Newburger v. Lubell,
259 N.Y. 383, 386, 178 N.E. 669, 670 (1931)). There can be no waiver of the right to arbitration when the party allegedly waiving his rights was unaware of a dispute. See CountryWide Ins. Co. v. Frolich, 119 Misc. 2d 1089, 1092, 465 N.Y.S.2d 446, 448 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
Kings County 1983).
"Waiver of the right to arbitrate may bar a party from obtaining an order compelling
arbitration or staying an action pending arbitration ... ." 8 WK&M § 7503.14, at 75-90
(1987). See generally Comment, Waiver of the Right to Compel Arbitration-A Directional
Analysis, 16 CAL. W.L. REv. 375, 375-78 (1980) (general overview of waiver of arbitration
with specific reference to California).
I See Finkeistein v. Harris, 17 App. Div. 2d 137, 138-39, 233 N.Y.S.2d 174, 176 (1st
Dep't 1962). Although the courts are not involved in the arbitration process itself, they are
often called upon to decide threshold questions such as "whether the dispute is arbitrable
and whether the arbitration has been sought within the applicable period of limitations."
See SIEGEL § 591, at 842. Section 7503 of New York's CPLR provides the procedure whereby
an aggrieved party may seek an order to compel or stay arbitration. See CPLR 7503(a), (b)
(McKinney 1980); see also Plateis v. Flax, 54 App. Div. 2d 813, 814, 388 N.Y.S.2d 245, 246
(3d Dep't 1976) (unreasonable delay in asserting right to arbitrate may constitute waiver);
Heldman v. Douglas, 47 App. Div. 2d 838, 839, 365 N.Y.S.2d 561, 563 (2d Dep't 1975) (five
year delay in asserting right to arbitrate constituted waiver).
" See Nagy, 242 N.Y. at 98, 150 N.E. at 614.
' See, e.g., De Sapio v. Kohlmeyer, 35 N.Y.2d 402, 405-06, 321 N.E.2d 770, 772, 362
N.Y.S.2d 843, 846-47 (1974) (affirmative use of judicial forum, even cross claim, inconsistent
with later attempt to force arbitration); United Paper Mach. Corp. v. DiCarlo, 14 N.Y.2d
814, 815, 200 N.E.2d 453, 453, 251 N.Y.S.2d 469, 469 (1964) (right to arbitrate waived if
action commenced three days after demand for arbitration); Zimmerman v. Cohen, 236 N.Y.
15, 19, 139 N.E. 764, 765 (1923) (right to arbitrate waived when plaintiff instituted action
and defendant counterclaimed).
The assumption that the commencement of an action constitutes an implied waiver of
the right to arbitrate may extend to the defendant, depending on the degree of participation
in the action. See De Sapio, 35 N.Y.2d at 405, 321 N.E.2d at 772, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 846. The
court in De Sapio noted:
In the absense of unreasonable delay, so long as the defendant's actions are consistent with an assertion of the right to arbitrate, there is no waiver. However,
where the defendant's participation in the lawsuit manifests an affirmative acceptance of the judicial forum ... his actions are then inconsistent with a later claim
that only the arbitral forum is satisfactory.
Id.; see also Clurman v. Clurman, 52 N.Y.2d 1036, 1038, 420 N.E.2d 385, 386, 438 N.Y.S.2d
504, 505 (1981) (defendant waived right to arbitrate by defending motion for summary judgment); Gabor v. Spicyn, 99 App. Div. 2d 1000, 1001, 473 N.Y.S.2d 457, 458-59 (1st Dep't
1984) (accepting court as proper forum precluded defendants' request for arbitration eight
months later); Esquire Indus., Inc. v. East Bay Textiles, Inc., 68 App. Div. 2d 845, 846, 414
N.Y.S.2d 336, 337 (1st Dep't 1979) (defendant's application to stay arbitration constituted a
waiver by defendants of the right to arbitrate). But see Hosiery Mfg. Corp. v. Goldston, 238
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cept when the plaintiff seeks to arbitrate a claim which is separate
and distinct from the issue before the court.' Recently, in Assael v.
Assael,7 the Appellate Division, First Department, reaffirmed this
exception by holding that the commencement of an action to resolve one claim does not constitute an implied waiver of the contractual right to compel arbitration of a separate issue arising from
the same agreement.8
In Assael, the plaintiffs and defendants each owned fifty percent of Daisy Sportswear Inc. ("DSI") and, following irreconcilable
disputes, drafted corporate agreements that divided DSI's business
into two separate corporations providing, however, that DSI remain in existence until the two corporations became independently
viable.9 Both agreements contained broad arbitration clauses as
well as injunctive remedies for specific breaches of the contracts. 10
Soon after the agreements were signed, the plaintiffs alleged speN.Y. 22, 27, 143 N.E. 779, 780 (1924) (defendant does not waive arbitration right by answering and asserting counterclaims); Chapman-Kruge Corp. v. Jaffe, 239 App. Div. 795, 796, 263
N.Y.S. 737, 738 (2d Dep't 1933) (defendant's assertion of counterclaim in answer not a
waiver).
6 See Denihan v. Denihan, 34 N.Y.2d 307, 310, 313 N.E.2d 759, 760, 357 N.Y.S.2d 454,
456 (1974). Generally, New York courts have held there is no relinquishment of the right to
arbitrate issues other than the one raised in the court action, even if they arise from the
same contract. See, e.g., Clurman, 52 N.Y.2d at 1036-37, 420 N.E.2d at 386, 438 N.Y.S.2d at
505 (although defendant waived right to arbitrate under one paragraph of separation agreement, he retained right to arbitrate under other paragraphs); Mendelsohn v. A&D Catering
Corp., 100 App. Div. 2d 209, 216, 473 N.Y.S.2d 481, 486 (2d Dep't 1984) (resorting to judicial forum for protective relief did not waive right to arbitrate distinct and separate claims);
see also Comment, Contract Law-Waiver of ArbitrationRights by LitigatingOne Issue is
not a Waiver of the Same Rights as to Other Issues, 12 U. BALT. L. REv. 585, 587-88 (1983)
(distinguishing cases with separate and distinct issues from single issue cases).
' 132 App. Div. 2d 4, 521 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1st Dep't 1987).
- Id. at 8, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
9 Id. at 5-6, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 226-27. The parties drafted two agreements, a Tri-Corporate Agreement and a Shareholders Agreement. Id. at 5, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 226. The TnCorporate Agreement provided for a "start up" period so the two new corporations could
establish their own credit and business relationships before the dissolution of DSI. Id. at 6,
521 N.Y.S.2d at 227. It also prohibited the parties from conducting any activity that would
hinder DS's credit, and provided that such conduct would be a material breach. Id. The
parties also agreed not to disclose the other's trade secrets or customer lists, or to solicit the
other's customers. Id. The agreements provided that DSI was to be dissolved on December
31, 1988 or upon earlier termination of the Tri-Corporate Agreement. Id.
10 Id. The arbitration clauses in essence provided that "any dispute or controversy regarding the terms of [the Agreements] or the rights and obligations of any of the parties to
[the Agreements]" is subject to arbitration. Id. In addition, the parties agreed that breaches
which threatened the underlying purpose of their agreement could be enjoined without
waiving the right to seek other remedies. Id. at 9, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
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cific contractual violations that impacted on the viability of DSI. 1 1
To enjoin further violations the plaintiffs chose to commence an
action in court, rather than rely on arbitration. The defendants opposed the injunction and cross moved for dissolution of the corporation, claiming similar breaches on the part of the plaintiffs.12 In
response, the plaintiffs moved to compel arbitration of the dissolution issue.13 The Supreme Court, New York County, denied the
plaintiffs' motion, holding that the motion to enjoin violations of
the agreement involved the same issues as the arbitration proceeding.1 4 Thus, the court concluded, the plaintiffs' election to seek an
injunction constituted a waiver of their right to arbitrate the corporation's dissolution.1 5
The Appellate Division, First Department, reversed, holding
"that there is a critical, and important, distinction between an action to enjoin, and seek damages for, violations of an agreement,
and a proceeding intended to terminate the agreement."1 6 Noting
that plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction was separate
from the dissolution issue and specifically authorized under the
contract, the majority reinstated the plaintiffs' right to arbitrate
the dissolution of the corporation.
In contrast, the dissent, citing Sherrill v. Grayco Builders,
Inc.,"8' stated that unless the claims involved in both the litigation
and the requested arbitration are "entirely separate," the right to
arbitrate one will be lost by an election to litigate the other.19 Noting that the same factual issues were raised in both proceedings,
, Id. at 7, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 227.
12 Id. The lower court granted a preliminary injunction, restraining both the plaintiffs

and the defendants from violating either of the corporate agreements. Id.
IsId. The plaintiffs sought to compel arbitration pursuant to CPLR 7503(a) and to stay
the dissolution proceeding. Id.
14 Id. at 8, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
15 Id.
26 Id. at 10, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 229. The appellate court granted the motion to stay the
dissolution proceeding. Id. at 8, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 228.
'7 See id. at 9-10, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 229. The court noted that the corporate agreements
"specifically authorized each side to seek injunctive relief in the event of specified material
breaches by the other side, and to do so without waiving any other remedies to which the
moving party might be entitled." Id. at 9, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 229. Thus, the court distinguished the action for injunctive relief from the dissolution proceeding, seeing them as alternative remedies. Id. at 10, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
Is 64 N.Y.2d 261, 475 N.E.2d 772, 486 N.Y.S.2d 159 (1985).
19 Assael, 132 App. Div. 2d at 15, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 232 (Smith, J., dissenting); see also
Sherrill, 64 N.Y.2d at 272, 475 N.E.2d at 775-76, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 162-63 (waiver of right to
arbitrate because of active participation in litigation over extended period).
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the dissent concluded that the plaintiff had waived all rights to
arbitrate the dissolution claim.2 °
While the Assael court correctly interpreted the parties' contractual agreements by allowing them to resolve their disputes in
different forums, it is suggested that in certain instances such bifurcation is inefficient.21 Multiple proceedings involving issues that
are not "entirely separate" are counterproductive and undermine
the primary reason for arbitration-the efficient and expedient resolution of disputes.2 In such instances, the court should consider
its policy of enforcing arbitration agreements in light of the potential costs and burdens of resolving contractual issues in different
forums.23 Consequently, when cost and delay will increase if the
20 Assael, 132 App. Div. 2d at 15, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 232 (Smith, J., dissenting). Justice
Smith noted that the same issues of harrassment, breaches of the corporate agreements, and
wrongful solicitation of employees "were raised in both the litigation commenced by the
[plaintiffs] and in the dissolution proceeding which the [plaintiffs] ... seek to have arbitrated." Id. (Smith, J., dissenting).
21 See Denihan v. Denihan, 34 N.Y.2d 307, 311, 313 N.E.2d 759, 761, 357 N.Y.S.2d 454,
456 (1974). The New York Court of Appeals has intimated that it will not honor an arbitration clause that hinders the credibility or operation of the court. See id. In Denihan, the
Court of Appeals noted that "[w]hile there is no legal impediment to arbitration... we
cannot but remark that by flitting between forums the parties have abused both the arbitration process and the courts." Id. Judge Rabin reiterated the court's viewpoint in De Sapio v.
Kohlmeyer, noting that "[t]he courtroom may not be used as a convenient vestibule to the
arbitration hall so as to allow a party to create his own unique structure combining litigation
and arbitration." 35 N.Y.2d at 406, 321 N.E.2d at 773, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 847.
22 See Mole v. Queen Ins. Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 1, 3, 217 N.Y.S.2d 330, 332 (4th Dep't
1961) ("principal purpose of arbitration is to reach a speedy and final result and to avoid
protracted litigation"); see also Spring Cotton Mills v. Buster Boy Suit Co., 275 App. Div.
196, 200, 88 N.Y.S.2d 295, 298 (1st Dep't), aff'd, 300 N.Y. 586, 89 N.E.2d 887 (1949) (arbitration provides means for expeditious and effective settlement of disputes); Ferber v.
Schultz, 104 Misc. 2d 1009, 1011, 429 N.Y.S.2d 861, 863 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Kings County 1980)
(arbitration intended to dispose of disputes in rapid and inexpensive manner, thus avoiding
litigation).
In recognizing the potential for overlap between judicial and arbitration proceedings,
New York courts frequently stay one proceeding to await a final resolution of the other. See,
e.g., Slepian v. Beanstalk Restaurant, Inc., 75 App. Div. 2d 749, 749, 427 N.Y.S.2d 421, 422
(1st Dep't 1980) (court enjoined escrow agent from delivering corporate stock because disposition of stock would nullify pending arbitration); Armco Steel Corp. v. Renago Constr., Inc.,
34 App. Div. 2d 887, 888, 312 N.Y.S.2d 161, 162 (4th Dep't 1970) (court proceeding stayed
because arbitration may make court action superfluous); accord Midwest Window Sys., Inc.
v. Amcor Indus., Inc., 630 F.2d 535 (7th Cir. 1980). In Midwest, the court consolidated the
arbitration and court controversies into one proceeding to be tried before the court, noting
that one party cannot bifurcate and complicate the dispute by changing forums and rules.
Id. at 537. But see Denihan, 34 N.Y.2d at 311, 313 N.E.2d at 761, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 456
(dictum) (although proceeding in two forums was unorthodox, it matched the parties
intent).
2 Other courts have adopted this rationale and consider cost and efficiency before giv-

1988]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

clause is enforced, it is urged that the court, looking beyond the
plain meaning of the arbitration provision to the intent of the
drafters, deny multiple proceedings.
The Assael court reaffirmed the common law rule that participation in a court action does not necessarily constitute a waiver of
the right to arbitrate separate issues.2 In so doing, the court has
reiterated the importance of distinguishing the issues addressed in
the court action from distinct issues that arise from the same
agreement. 25 As the majority noted, New York follows a "flexible

and balanced approach to the issue of waiver."2 6 Therefore, it
seems that a case-by-case determination of what constitutes "separate" issues is necessary in similar cases involving waiver of arbitration rights.
Moreover, the practitioner would be well advised to recognize
that the Assael holding is limited to its unique factual setting. It is
suggested that in the absence of a similar contractual provision,
specifically providing for injunctive relief in addition to arbitration, the court should advance the intent of the parties to curtail
costs by consolidating proceedings that involve related issues even
if it results in the waiver of a remedy.
Michele R. Pistone

CIVIL

PRACTICE LAW AND RULEs

CPLR 213(1): Six-year "catch-all"statute of limitations provision
is applicable to a claim under the Taylor Law alleging the breach
of a public union's duty of fair representation
Article 2 of New York's CPLR provides the applicable statute
ing arbitration favorable treatment. See, e.g., J.F. Inc. v. Vicik, 99 Ill. App. 3d 815, 820, 426
N.E.2d 257, 261 (1981) (rejecting right to arbitrate issues factually similar to those being

litigated because arbitration would increase cost and delay); Prestressed Concrete, Inc. v.
Adolsfson & Peterson, Inc., 308 Minn. 20, 24, 240 N.W.2d 551, 553 (1976) (arbitration not

favored because it increases cost and delay).

2, Assael, 132 App. Div. 2d at 8, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 228.

25Id. at 9, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 229.
20 Id. at 8, 521 N.Y.S.2d at 228.

